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 Port Updates

 Daily Port Update

Date:Thursday, September 25, 2008


Maximum Depths - (Fresh)
Harbor Entrance - 47.0 ft
Main Channel - 45.0 ft

Current maximum drafts allowed at berths:

Amerada Hess - Max draft of 40’00
Kinder Morgan - berth 1 - 40'00
Kinder Morgan - berth 2 - 40'00
Kinder Morgan - berth 3 – TBA
Kinder Morgan - berth 4 - Max draft 39'00, tide needed for anything
than 36'00
Wando Terminal - Max draft 46'00 - Max BM 187'00
North Charleston Terminal - Max 42'00 - Max BM 187'00
CST - Max draft 47'00 - Max BM 187'00
Nucor – Max draft 25'00 (movements daylight & tidal restricted), Max LOA
450', Max Beam 52'

Per pilots - restrictions for Tanker movements:
Drafts of 36'00 or less may transit at anytime Drafts of 36'01 to 40'00 -
window: Start in 1 Hour before low water until 2 hours before high water
Drafts of 40'01 to 41'00 - window: start in 2 hours after low water until
2 hours before high water
Drafts of 41'01 to 42'00 - window: start in 3 hours after low water
3 hours before high water



96 Hours - advance notice of arrival required by USCG

48 Hours - advance receipt of crew list by Immigration for any vessel
arriving from a foreign port, or arriving coast wise with detained crew.

24 Hours (minimum) - Foreign cargo must have manifest submitted to
& Border Patrol AMS. Bond must be filed for Foreign flag vessels or U.S.
flag arriving with foreign cargo aboard.

24 Hours - advance notice to Pilots

24 Hours - advance fax of crew list and approved visitors required by

72 Hours - post port call, the Port Authority requires bill of lading
figures for all bulk cargo.

Port Security - All persons doing business within Port Authority property
must have security pass from SCPA.



Testimony of Charles E. Allen before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment

Release Date: September 24, 2008

Cannon House Office Building
(Remarks as Prepared)

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the
Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the progress that the Department of Homeland Security has made,
and will continue to make, on its intelligence and information sharing

As you know, the Intelligence Community's focus traditionally has been
aimed at foreign threats and its customer set focused on international
level partners. The Community's interaction with State, local and tribal
law enforcement and other first responders intentionally was limited or
non-existent. But homeland security, in a post-9/11 world, requires a new
paradigm for intelligence support. My task as Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief Intelligence Officer for the
Department has been to lead the effort to develop the vision for, design
the architecture of, and implement a comprehensive homeland security
intelligence program that is fully integrated into the traditional
Intelligence Community but which equally reaches out to new, essential
partners at all levels of government and within the private sector.

This was no small task and required new authorities, new structures, and
new kinds of cooperation across the Community. I commend Congress for
providing key authorities to the DHS intelligence efforts in support of
our mission, particularly through the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. By elevating the head of Intelligence and
Analysis to an Under Secretary level and significantly expanding the
position's authorities to integrate and standardize the intelligence
components, products, and processes of the Department, these authorities
have provided an essential foundation for development of an effective
Department-wide intelligence effort.
The DHS Intelligence Mission

DHS intelligence authorities were first established in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, with additional authorities provided later in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and, as
mentioned previously, the 9/11 Commission Act. The specific mission of
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—DHS' primary representative
in the Intelligence Community—has been reinforced since the Homeland
Security Act, including in the recent amendments to Executive Order 12333.

The Secretary personally defined the role of intelligence in the
Department as a result of his 2005 Second Stage Review, in which he
emphasized that, "Intelligence is at the heart of everything we do.” One
central conclusion from this review was that the Department required a
strong intelligence arm to focus on Departmental needs. As a result, the
Secretary established the position of Chief Intelligence Officer to lead
and manage the integration of the Department's intelligence programs.

When I arrived at DHS in late 2005 after the conclusion of the Second
Stage Review, I committed to delivering results against the critical
priorities identified by the Secretary.

My overarching priorities for the DHS Intelligence Enterprise have been:

* Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across the
* Integrating DHS Intelligence across its several components;
* Strengthening our support to State, local, and tribal authorities
as well as to the private sector;
* Ensuring that DHS Intelligence takes its full place in the
Intelligence Community; and
* Solidifying our relationship with Congress by improving our
transparency and responsiveness.

Before providing you the details of the progress we have made on these
priorities, I want to emphasize the breadth of the customer set we serve.
It is unique in the Intelligence Community. The DHS Intelligence
Enterprise must effectively serve all homeland security customers,
including all of DHS, our State, local, tribal, territorial, and private
sector partners, and the Intelligence Community. Each of these customers
has different needs.

Let me start by discussing our fundamental responsibility to support our
primary customer—the Department—including both headquarters as well as
operational components. The Secretary defines the Department's mission as
keeping dangerous people and dangerous goods from crossing our air, land,
and sea borders and protecting our critical infrastructures. This
requires having reliable, real-time information and intelligence to allow
the Department to identify and characterize threats uniformly, support
security countermeasures, and achieve unity of effort in the response. As
you will see when I discuss our analytic efforts, I have aligned our
intelligence efforts to support these needs.

An equally important customer is our state and local partners—we must
meet the intelligence needs of our State, local, tribal, and territorial
customers. We are ensuring these stakeholders have access to our key
intelligence and information capabilities, and the Department, in turn,
has access to information obtained by these partners in the course of
their operations.

In addition, DHS Intelligence and Analysis is reaching out to a broad
spectrum of private sector representatives. We have learned that private
sector information requirements are not only numerous, but have become
more complex as our private sector partners have become more
knowledgeable about our capabilities to support them. As a result we have
focused products and services to meet these particular needs.

Finally, the Intelligence Community remains a key customer. DHS
Intelligence and Analysis is a trusted member of the Intelligence
Community, under the leadership of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI). My Office is taking its place in all the senior Intelligence
Community forums, including serving as a member of the DNI's Executive
Committee. We also contribute to the President's National Intelligence
Priorities Framework, and prepare analytic assessments for the
President's Daily Brief and the National Terrorism Bulletin.
Integrating the Intelligence Mission Across DHS

As noted above, one of my key priorities has been to create an integrated
intelligence enterprise that unites the efforts of the entire Department.
I have taken significant steps to build such an enterprise, for example,
establishing the Homeland Security Intelligence Council composed of the
heads of the intelligence components in the Department. It is the
principal decision-making forum for ensuring effective integration of all
of the Department's intelligence activities. I also directed the creation
of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan. First issued in
January 2006, it established a strong, unified, and long-term direction
for our enterprise. We have just updated this plan to reflect our new
authorities and responsibilities.

These efforts were enhanced by the issuance of the DHS Policy for
Internal Information Exchange and Sharing that was signed by the
Secretary in February 2007. Referred to as the "One DHS” memorandum, its
purpose is to promote a cohesive, collaborative, and unified Department-
wide information sharing environment. The Secretary expanded this policy
in May 2008 when he issued the DHS Information Sharing Strategy, which
provides strategic direction and guidance for all DHS information sharing
efforts, both within DHS and with our external partners.
Improving Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence analysis is at the very core of what we do and is why I made
improving our analysis my top priority. It is driven by a dynamic threat
environment; the need to support legacy, new, and ever-expanding homeland
security customers; and the need to respond quickly to emerging threats
that require synthesizing intelligence from both traditional and non-
traditional sources.

Our analysis is focused on five critical areas that are closely aligned
with the Secretary's mission priorities:

* Border security to keep out dangerous people and materials;
* Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats as
well as other health threats;
* Critical infrastructure protection;
* Demographics to understand the flow and movement of potentially
dangerous people; and
* Radicalization in order to understand the development of
potentially dangerous ideologies in the domestic arena.

Let me provide a little more detail about each of these.

Border Security
I created a Border Security Branch – the first of its kind in the
Intelligence Community -- to fulfill a critical need for strategic
intelligence on threats to our country's borders. To keep out dangerous
people, my analysts track the full range of threats to our borders,
including terrorists, special interest aliens, narco-traffickers, alien
smugglers, and transnational gangs.

To help protect our nation against dangerous materials brought across
U.S. borders, I have established a CBRN Branch, that assesses the threats
in-bound and globally. My analysts support other Department and
interagency offices and programs, such as DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, the National Bio-Surveillance Integration System, and the
National Center for Medical Intelligence. We provide detailed assessments
that are incorporated into the design and development of high-tech
sensors for harmful CBRN materials at airports and other sites. Our
analysts also assess threats from pandemic diseases, such as avian
influenza, and biological threats such as foot-and-mouth disease that
could cross our borders and devastate our agricultural economy.

Critical Infrastructure
To protect our critical infrastructure, our analysts assess the threats
to each of the 18 critical infrastructure/key resource sectors in this
country. We produce detailed assessments characterizing the threats to
critical infrastructure in all 50 States, the National Capital Area, and
U.S. territories, including baseline assessments on each of the 18
critical sectors. These assessments are routinely written with and shared
with our state and local stakeholders.

Demographic Movements
Our analysts also assess demographic movements around the world and into
the United States to develop an accurate picture of dangerous people who
might come to our borders. Using the mandate from the 9/11 Commission
Act, the DNI designated DHS as the lead Intelligence Community entity
responsible for biennial Visa Waiver Program assessments. We
independently assess the integrity and security of travel processes and
documentation for each country in or applying to the program to address
the potential for illicit actors—including transnational criminals,
extremists, and terrorists—to exploit travel systems and the security
environment that can facilitate unlawful access to the United States.

Our analysts also are concerned about dangerous people inside our
borders, especially those who are trying to recruit for or engage in
violent extremism. We focus primarily on the process of radicalization,
or how individuals adopt extremist belief systems that lead to their
willingness to support, facilitate, or use violence to cause social
change. I should add that we are concerned with all types of violent
extremists, including racial supremacists, anarchists, eco-terrorists,
Islamic extremists, and animal rights radicals. All of our analysis is
performed while abiding by applicable rules that protect our citizens'
rights to privacy and civil liberties.
Information Sharing

Central to our intelligence responsibilities is the sharing of
intelligence and information with the State and local partners as well as
the entire Intelligence Community. DHS has a statutorily mandated role in
information sharing as prescribed by the Homeland Security Act of 2002
and ensuing legislation. It has taken important steps to fulfill this
role. I have already mentioned the important One DHS Memorandum that
provides an essential foundation for the Department's information-sharing
efforts. Other foundational pieces include the Department's Information
Sharing Governance Board (ISGB) that serves as the executive level
steering committee and decision making body for all information sharing
activities within the Department. I serve as chair for the ISGB. We also
formed the DHS Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC), an
advisory, action-oriented body that is fully representative of the
Department's many organizational elements.

We are also establishing Shared Mission Communities (SMCs) within DHS.
The SMCs are cross-cutting information-sharing efforts that address the
need to build integrated cultures, processes, and policies that
facilitate information sharing across organizational boundaries. I am
pleased to share with the committee our efforts with the Law Enforcement
Shared Mission Community (LE SMC). The LE SMC was the first shared
mission community to be established and unites the full breadth of DHS
law enforcement elements to enhance information sharing among components,
other Federal agencies, and State, local and tribal law enforcement

State and Local Program Office
Building and improving our relationships with State, local, tribal, and
private sector partners is the cornerstone of the Department's
information-sharing efforts. As the 9/11 Commission Act and the
President's National Strategy for Information Sharing make clear, fusion
centers are an essential part of this information flow and framework. As
you know, I am the Department's Executive Agent for its program to
support fusion centers nationwide. DHS is committed to providing fusion
centers with the people and tools they need to participate in the
Information Sharing Environment.

DHS recognized the importance of these fusion centers and established a
State and local fusion center program office in 2006, even prior to the
enactment of the 9/11 Commission Act. Our program office is responsible
for deploying intelligence officers to fusion centers nationwide. These
officers are my representatives in the field who ensure that DHS is
fulfilling its information-sharing responsibilities. Core activities of
our intelligence officers include providing daily intelligence support;
routinely communicating and exchanging information with other fusion
centers; writing products for and with State and local partners;
collaborating on research; and delivering intelligence products to all
customers. Deployed officers provide analytic training opportunities and
real-time threat warning guidance directly to State and local partners.
These officers can also collaborate with FBI analysts to develop joint

As of today, my Office has deployed 25 intelligence officers to 23 fusion
centers nationwide. Our goal is to deploy 35 officers by the end of 2008.
DHS would like to eventually deploy up to 70 officers to the field, one
to each State-designated fusion center as well as officers in several
major cities. The presence of these important DHS personnel assets in the
field has served to create strong personal relationships with our State
and local partners. They serve as the front line of the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise and help ensure that DHS is meeting these important customer

In addition, to meet specific State and local information needs, we have
developed a national set of SLFC Priority Information Needs (PINs) that
reflect the critical mission needs of fusion centers. We are using these
PINs to expand analytic exchanges between fusion centers and I&A analysts
and to drive I&A production planning.

Information Sharing Networks for State, Local, and Tribal Customers
My Office also provides these non-Federal authorities direct access to
DHS intelligence and information through both classified and unclassified
networks. A critical part of our efforts at the unclassified level is the
Homeland Security Information Network's "Intelligence” portal. Known as
HSIN-Intelligence, this portal provides more than 8,000 people with
access to unclassified intelligence products. More significantly, my
Office has created the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence
Community of Interest (HS SLIC). The HS SLIC is the first nationwide
network of Federal, State, and Local intelligence analysts focused on
homeland security ever created in the United States. The HS SLIC is a
virtual community of intelligence analysts that fosters collaboration and
sharing of best practices and lessons learned through access to a special
portal within the HSIN network. Through the HS SLIC, intelligence
analysts collaborate via weekly For Official Use Only-level threat
teleconferences and biweekly Secret-level secure video teleconferences.
Members are able to share intelligence and information in appropriately
secure and privacy-sensitive environments. The community also sponsors
regional and national analytic conferences based on the interests of its
members. As evidence of its value and success, its membership has grown
dramatically from a six-state pilot in 2006 to now having members
representing 45 States, the District of Columbia, and seven Federal
Agencies. In addition, I have established an HS SLIC Advisory Board that
includes State and local partners to advise me on issues relating to
intelligence collaboration with our non-Federal partners.

For our classified networks, we are in the process of deploying the
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) at fusion centers across the country.
With this network, we are delivering, for the first time, classified
threat information to State and local authorities on a regular basis. I
believe this unprecedented type of communication will lead to a sea
change in relations between Federal and State analysts. To date, we have
deployed HSDN to 24 fusion centers nationwide and are working to have it
in 40 centers by the end of this year.

To further expand State and local connectivity to the Intelligence
Community, HSDN provides access to NCTC On-line—a classified portal that
maintains the most current terrorism-related information at the Secret
level. Our long-term goal is for each fusion center to have not only HSDN
access but its own webpage to which relevant products can be posted and
made available to other fusion centers and the broader Intelligence

Protection of Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
My Office continually is taking preventative steps to ensure that the
rights of American citizens are safeguarded; this is especially true as
it relates to the State and Local Fusion Center program. DHS requires all
deployed intelligence officers to take an annual intelligence oversight
and information handling course that addresses proper handling of U.S.
person information. DHS also collaboratively developed and is
implementing privacy and civil liberties training for all its deployed
intelligence officers, in accordance with the 9/11 Commission Act.

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
DHS remains a full partner in, a leader within, and a staunch supporter
of the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG). This
group has become a critical mechanism for serving the information needs
of our State, local, tribal, and private sector partners. Established at
the direction of the President in his Guideline 2 report and the 9/11
Commission Act, it pulls together federal and non-federal homeland
security, law enforcement, and intelligence officers from a variety of
disciplines to guide the development and dissemination of federal
terrorism-related intelligence products through DHS and the FBI to our
non-Federal partners. While the ITACG is integrated into NCTC, its
mission is more expansive than the scope of the NCTC mission. The ITACG
officers monitor sensitive databases, and screen hundreds of highly
classified finished intelligence reports each day to determine what
should be sanitized and/or enhanced for sharing with our non-Federal

The ITACG consists of two elements: the ITACG Detail and the Advisory
Council. The Detail is the group of individuals who sit at the NCTC and
conduct the day-to-day work of the ITACG. The Council sets policy and
develops processes for the integration, analysis, and dissemination of
Federally-coordinated information, as well as overseeing the ITACG Detail
and its work.

The Detail achieved initial operating capability just eight months ago--
on January 30, 2008. While fully integrated into the work and leadership
at NCTC, the Detail is led by one of my senior intelligence officers who
serves as the ITACG Director. The Deputy Director is a senior analyst
from the FBI. The FBI and my Office have each provided an additional
senior analyst to help with the operation of the Detail. Currently there
are four law enforcement officers from State and local police
departments, a tribal representative who works at NCTC, and two NCTC
contractors with extensive experience in the Intelligence Community and
State and local law enforcement assigned to the Detail. These non-Federal
participants provide critical insight into the needs and perspectives of
our State, local, tribal and private sector partners. We are working hard
to expand the number of non-Federal participants to 10 in order to
include a broader range of State and local expertise.

The members of the Detail have essential systems connectivity in NCTC,
participate in key briefings, and are engaged in the NCTC production
processes and activities that provide broad perspectives of the
Intelligence Community. They then act as advocates for State, local
tribal and private sector partners by informing and shaping Intelligence
Community products to better meet the specific needs of State, local,
tribal and private sector entities. They support the production of three
types of reports: alerts; warnings; notifications; as well as updates of
time-sensitive information related to terrorist threats to the United
States; situational awareness reports regarding significant events or
activities occurring at all U.S. levels and internationally; and
strategic and foundational assessments of terrorist threats to the United
States. In the event of conflicting reporting or as the need arises, the
ITACG facilitates Federal coordination to ensure that reporting on threat
information is as clear and actionable as possible.

We have also established the ITACG Advisory Council that I chair on
behalf of the Secretary. The Council, at least 50 percent of whose
members must represent State, local, and tribal organizations, has become
a robust organization with participation of its non-Federal members in
all of its decision-making processes. Although the 9/11 Commission Act
requires that it meet a minimum of four times a year, its work is too
important and too pressing to meet so infrequently. Instead, I directed
that we meet in person or by teleconference monthly. Five face-to-face
meetings have been held to date with the sixth scheduled for late
October. Meetings in other months are conducted via teleconference—the
next one is scheduled for this week. These meetings address a priority
challenge that this new organization faces – especially recruiting
outstanding State, local, and tribal personnel to serve on the Detail,
establishing an attractive Fellowship Program for the selected detailees,
developing formal mechanisms to ensure that information is getting to the
right customers, and creating a feedback process tailored for State,
local, tribal and private sector customers. I am extremely proud of the
team we have assembled – both for the Detail and the Advisory Council –
and expect great things from their continuing contributions to this
critical work. I also am grateful for the strong support that I receive
from Mike Leiter and NCTC in the overall management of the ITACG program.
Other Accomplishments of DHS Intelligence

I recognize that this hearing is geared toward establishing a "report
card” on information-sharing activities of the Department. Information
sharing, however, supports and is interwoven into key enabling programs
managed by DHS Intelligence. Therefore, I want to share with the
Committee the progress we have made in creating an integrated DHS
Intelligence program beyond just sharing information.

Quite candidly, we are building a new departmental intelligence
organization where one did not exist three years ago. We have had to
recruit and train new cadres of intelligence officers, integrate existing
departmental and external intelligence and information sharing functions,
comport Department practices with Intelligence Community standards, and
fundamentally define the realm of homeland security intelligence.

Our intelligence is distinct from that of CIA, the FBI, NCTC, and
elsewhere in the Intelligence Community as it encompasses the totality of
threats to the Homeland—not just terrorism.

Collection Responsibilities and Reforms
I&A collection activities have improved support to our customers and
enhanced our readiness posture relative to the Department's all-hazards
threat environment. We are the Department's collections focal point for
delivery of Intelligence Community capabilities to the Department and to
other Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and international

My Office's mission is unique within the Intelligence Community as we are
at the crossroads of the Intelligence Community and the Department's law
enforcement organizations. For example, in coordination with the National
HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center, we have developed the southwest and
northern border National HUMINT Collection Directives (NHCDs) in support
of U.S. southwest border enforcement initiatives. Collection directives
provide the Department's components with the critical HUMINT reporting
required to support Homeland Security operations. The border collection
directives represent the first time DHS has led development of a national
collections strategy.

As part of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architecture, my Office completed an ISR baseline for and in coordination
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection. This baseline will help identify
gaps and redundancies in order to facilitate the most informed ISR
resource decisions, while allowing the Department to develop new
capabilities and create enterprise-level collection management processes
that meet tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence needs.

The DHS Open Source Enterprise has been established to acquire and
disseminate domestic open source information on Homeland threat issues,
and represents departmental and State and local interests in the National
Open Source Enterprise's National Open Source Committee.

I released the DHS Open Source Enterprise Strategic Vision on September
12th at the National Open Source Conference, which we co-hosted with the
Office of the DNI and the Open Source Center. Our Open Source vision
clearly establishes DHS' intelligence role as a focal point for open
source among the homeland security law enforcement and first-preventer
communities. We are now implementing it and are in the process of
formally documenting our actions through an Implementation Plan.

We have a close and mutually supportive relationship with the
Intelligence Community on Open Source. I have a senior executive who
represents the homeland open source community on the National Open Source
Committee (NOSC) and all sub-committees. We continue to provide open
source reporting on the DHS homepage in Intelink-U, the DNI's
unclassified information network, and began providing actionable open
source reporting on the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence
Community of Interest web portal in March 2008. In sum, we have a robust
program underway that is focused on state and local government support.

DHS Intelligence Products
My Office has successfully adjusted our production in response to
communicated stakeholder needs. I streamlined my Office's finished
intelligence product line from more than 25 types of products to 6
distinct, standardized products that are customer-friendly and better
aligned to our core missions. Since 2005, we have disseminated 1,470
finished intelligence products, the majority at the Unclassified/For
Official Use Only level. Many of the most important products are
collaborative joint products it co-authors with state and local fusion
center personnel.

My production elements house the reports officer program, which
facilitates the timely sharing of homeland security-related information
obtained by DHS components, State, local, and tribal partners, and the
Intelligence Community. Currently, 19 reports officers are located at I&A
headquarters; 18 others support DHS components and elements, including
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. In addition, two officers are
deployed to State and local elements along the Southwest border and in

My reports officers access and share valuable intelligence and
information on topics such as transnational threats from the Caribbean
and Latin America and sensitive information from ports of entry. This
information is produced and distributed in the form of Homeland
Intelligence Reports, or HIRs, and is precisely the granular level of
information that is of greatest value to State and local authorities.
Since 2005, I&A has produced, and disseminated 8,777 HIRs to State,
local, and tribal partners and the Intelligence Community.

Intelligence Enterprise Training and Recruitment
Intelligence training is critical to develop an all-source cadre of DHS
intelligence professionals who have standardized knowledge and
competencies across the enterprise. The keystone of the learning roadmap
is our Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course (BITAC), which
provides a foundational understanding of intelligence and analysis
tradecraft. We have piloted four iterations of the five-week course to
date, reaching students from across the Department's intelligence
components. As a complement to BITAC, I am proud to announce that our Mid-
level Intelligence Threat Analysis Course (MITAC) started on September
15. This pilot is a 10-day course targeted at DHS intelligence
components' mid-career (GS 12-14) personnel.
Additional DHS Intelligence Programs of Note

National Applications Office
The National Applications Office (NAO) will be on the cutting edge for
supporting key DHS stakeholders. DHS has acquired and installed lawful
and appropriate intelligence capabilities to allow the NAO to access
commercial satellite data and national technical means. In preparation
for production, the NAO has developed performance management metrics; a
training plan to comply with the NAO charter requirements to train staff
and affiliates regarding privacy and civil liberties safeguards; and a
communications strategy. As a training exercise, NAO analysts assisted
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's preparation for the
Democratic and Republican National Conventions and in support and
response to Hurricanes Hanna and Ike.

The NAO was designed with strong protection of privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties. DHS has worked with the Homeland Security Council and
across the Federal government to develop the now-signed charter for the
NAO. The Secretary certified that the NAO charter complies with all
existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties
standards. Further, by law the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
conducted a review of the Secretary's certification. DHS has incorporated
GAO's two recommendations into various policy and procedural documents of
the NAO. Thus, the NAO is prepared to begin operations to support the
civil and homeland security domains.

In January 2007, Secretary Chertoff directed the establishment of a DHS
Counterintelligence Program to detect and deter the growing threat posed
by foreign intelligence services, terrorists, and foreign criminal
enterprises. At the Secretary's direction, I stood up a
counterintelligence policy office within I&A. In conjunction with the DHS
Office of Security, we have drafted a strategic plan and
counterintelligence concept of operations, and sought review—working with
the DNI's Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive—to ensure
that the departmental counterintelligence program benefits from the
Intelligence Community's experience and best practices.

Integrated Border Intelligence Program
I&A's Integrated Border Intelligence Program (IBIP) fills a unique role
within the Department as the only program that can collectively leverage
state and local fusion center, Intelligence Community, and the
Department's own dedicated intelligence collection, analysis, and
reporting staff to strengthen intelligence support to and promote
information sharing among border security and interior enforcement

The Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST)—a key component of the IBIP—
is co-located with the El Paso Intelligence Center. The HIST serves as a
conduit for providing stakeholders along the U.S. southwest border with
reachback to intelligence collection, analytic expertise, and access to
the Intelligence Community. The HIST's cadre of professional intelligence
analysts and program managers uses its unique and routine access to
information in order to pull specific, relevant information for the
border mission stakeholders, and produce and disseminate reports with
mission-specific comments and context.

Partnering with Operations
I&A has been supporting the new DHS Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning (known as OPS) since its inception in July 2008. The
Intelligence Division of OPS is a unit detailed from I&A to optimize and
provide daily intelligence support to departmental and Federal
interagency planning and operational coordination efforts. The Division's
mission is to facilitate—at the departmental "strategic operational”
level—development of a common threat picture and prioritized intelligence
requirements, resources, and capabilities in support of contingency
planning and operations coordination across DHS components.

Highlights of the OPS Intelligence Division's efforts include identifying
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel to support the
DHS actions relating to Hurricanes Gustav, Hannah, and Ike; and
leveraging DHS and Intelligence Community products to support incident
response and recovery efforts.

As a member of the Intelligence Community, my Office supports the
planning and execution of the Administration's National Cyber Security
Initiative, serving as a member of the Cyber Study Group. We have also
placed intelligence analysts at the National Cyber Security Division's
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to enhance this
partnership between DHS and its stakeholders to protect the nation's
cyber infrastructure. Our analysts provide threat assessments and fuse
Intelligence Community information with daily intrusions monitored by US-
CERT. We are developing plans for Homeland Intelligence Reports to
include unique DHS information gleaned from US-CERT reports of intrusions
and attacks against Federal networks.
Challenges and the Way Ahead

Despite the gains we have made, we need to remember that challenges
continue as DHS intelligence remains a start-up effort and is still
evolving. I see these challenges in four critical areas: facilities,
recruitment and retention, excepted service, and procurement and

As our mission and workforce have grown, we are working with DHS
Facilities to ensure we provide adequate facilities and infrastructure.

Throughout the Department and in the Intelligence Community, there has
been a significant effort to recruit and retain an outstanding
intelligence workforce. As a result of the number of vacancies throughout
the Intelligence Community and the private sector, I&A and its
counterparts throughout the DHS Intelligence Enterprise are facing great
challenges to fill our vacancies and retain the staff we have onboard.

At times, our progress in recruiting and retaining the best and brightest
has struggled because we cannot compete effectively with Intelligence
Community agencies that have excepted service status. I recognize that
several authorization bills contain language to grant DHS Intelligence
the same excepted service flexibility available to its partner
organizations in the Intelligence Community. I strongly urge the
Committee to support enactment of excepted service authority for DHS
Intelligence to help us create the more unified and mobile intelligence
workforce envisioned by the 9/11 Commission Act and Intelligence
Community reform.

Another significant challenge for my Office has been the ability to
achieve timely planning, development, and execution of procurement and
acquisitions. Working closely with the DHS Office of Procurement
Operations we have made significant improvements in our acquisitions
program and continue to work towards establishing the right contractual
vehicles to meet our ever changing needs.

Continuing the task of building a quality intelligence organization that
can overcome these challenges is of critical importance as we move to a
new administration. We are on the right track; we must now execute these

On September 11, 2008, Secretary Chertoff wrote "…[on September 11,
2001,] our country was senselessly attacked and nearly 3,000 lives were
tragically lost. That fateful day changed our Nation and our lives.” Even
though that day was over seven years ago, the threat has not passed and
our adversaries remain committed to doing us harm. They have been foiled
by many factors, including the dedicated men and women of the Department
of Homeland Security who defend our Homeland every day.

To enable and support our critical departmental mission, we are
developing and honing homeland security intelligence. DHS intelligence
programs are young and growing, but we are working hard and with
increasing effectiveness to create integrated homeland security
structures where the operating components and DHS headquarters elements
work together. We are also making good progress to provide a unifying
role—developing and integrating the Department's Information Sharing
activities. My intention today was to crystallize these major
accomplishments in such a short time as well as to focus on the
challenges that we still need to overcome.

We remain committed to protecting the Homeland, to improving our analysis
and information sharing—especially with our state and local partners—and
to integrating DHS intelligence programs. In doing so, we scrupulously
adhere to the protection of our cherished privacy and civil liberties
rights. Protecting our nation from the myriad of threats that we face
requires courage and resolve. It is my steadfast belief that our
accomplishments show we are up to the task.


10/08 - 1800 - CWIT OYSTER ROAST




800 AM EDT THU SEP 25 2008








Tides for Charleston (Customhouse Wharf) starting with September 24,
Day High Tide Height Sunrise Moon Time % Moon
/Low Time Feet Sunset Visible

Th 25 High 5:14 AM 5.5 7:10 AM Rise 3:16 AM 21
25 Low 11:20 AM 0.3 7:12 PM Set 5:08 PM
25 High 5:44 PM 6.3

F 26 Low 12:04 AM 0.6 7:11 AM Rise 4:22 AM 13
26 High 6:12 AM 5.8 7:11 PM Set 5:40 PM
26 Low 12:17 PM 0.2
26 High 6:36 PM 6.3

Sa 27 Low 12:53 AM 0.4 7:12 AM Rise 5:25 AM 6
27 High 7:04 AM 6.0 7:09 PM Set 6:08 PM
27 Low 1:10 PM 0.1
27 High 7:22 PM 6.3

Su 28 Low 1:38 AM 0.2 7:12 AM Rise 6:27 AM 2
28 High 7:52 AM 6.3 7:08 PM Set 6:36 PM
28 Low 2:00 PM 0.1
28 High 8:05 PM 6.2

M 29 Low 2:20 AM 0.2 7:13 AM Rise 7:27 AM 0
29 High 8:36 AM 6.4 7:07 PM Set 7:04 PM
29 Low 2:46 PM 0.2
29 High 8:46 PM 6.0

Tu 30 Low 2:59 AM 0.2 7:14 AM Rise 8:28 AM 0
30 High 9:17 AM 6.4 7:05 PM Set 7:34 PM
30 Low 3:30 PM 0.4
30 High 9:25 PM 5.8

W 1 Low 3:37 AM 0.4 7:14 AM Rise 9:28 AM 2
1 High 9:57 AM 6.3 7:04 PM Set 8:06 PM
1 Low 4:13 PM 0.6
1 High 10:03 PM 5.5

Th 2 Low 4:13 AM 0.6 7:15 AM Rise 10:28 AM 6
2 High 10:36 AM 6.1 7:03 PM Set 8:42 PM
2 Low 4:55 PM 0.9
2 High 10:41 PM 5.3

F 3 Low 4:48 AM 0.9 7:16 AM Rise 11:27 AM 12
3 High 11:16 AM 5.9 7:01 PM Set 9:23 PM
3 Low 5:37 PM 1.1
3 High 11:20 PM 5.0

Sa 4 Low 5:25 AM 1.1 7:16 AM Rise 12:23 PM 19
4 High 11:59 AM 5.7 7:00 PM Set 10:09 PM
4 Low 6:20 PM 1.4

Su 5 High 12:03 AM 4.8 7:17 AM Rise 1:16 PM 27
5 Low 6:05 AM 1.3 6:59 PM Set 11:00 PM
5 High 12:46 PM 5.5
5 Low 7:07 PM 1.6

M 6 High 12:50 AM 4.7 7:18 AM Rise 2:04 PM 36
6 Low 6:51 AM 1.4 6:57 PM Set 11:55 PM
6 High 1:39 PM 5.4
6 Low 7:59 PM 1.7

Tu 7 High 1:43 AM 4.6 7:18 AM Rise 2:46 PM 45
7 Low 7:45 AM 1.5 6:56 PM
7 High 2:36 PM 5.4
7 Low 8:54 PM 1.7

W 8 High 2:41 AM 4.7 7:19 AM Set 12:53 AM 55
8 Low 8:46 AM 1.5 6:55 PM Rise 3:24 PM
8 High 3:33 PM 5.4
8 Low 9:49 PM 1.6



Today...Mostly cloudy with a 50 percent chance of showers. Highs around
70. Windy. North winds 20 to 30 mph with gusts up to 35 mph.

Tonight...Cloudy with a 50 percent chance of showers. Lows in the lower
60s. Breezy. Northwest winds 15 to 25 mph with gusts up to 35 mph.


Notice posted on Thursday, September 25, 2008

For quality assurance purposes please note well that while the above information is regularly vetted for accuracy it is not intended to replace the local knowledge or expertise pertaining to port conditions of our marine operations personnel. Port précis should always be verified by contacting the corresponding marine department of a particular location for the most up-to-date information.